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Introduction 
The potential for sufficiently severe poverty to undermine an individual’s human rights is recognised 
by the UK judiciary: 
“Human rights are the rights essential to the life and dignity of the individual in a 
democratic society… it is well arguable that human rights include the right to a minimum 
standard of living, without which many of the other rights would be a mockery.”1 
Legal academics also argue that human dignity – the “very essence” of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)2 and foundation of the UN human rights regime – demands protection from 
inhuman and degrading treatment and access to one’s essential needs.3 
The UK’s human rights regime privileges the (mainly civil and political) rights in the ECHR above the 
economic and social rights protected by other treaties, hindering human rights law from fulfilling its 
potential to protect against poverty. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), European Social Charter (ESC) and other social rights instruments are likely to 
remain legally marginal unless incorporated into domestic law. Ultimately, parliamentary supremacy 
means any human rights provision or element of the “law of humanity” requiring protection from 
poverty 4 can be overridden by primary legislation.  
Nonetheless, the UK has undertaken to respect, protect and fulfil certain rights and should be held 
accountable for success or failure to do so. The Special Rapporteur’s visit provides a vehicle for such 
accountability and, potentially, for raising the profile of social rights. Our submission draws on our 
collective expertise on poverty, social security, social rights and administrative justice. While 
reference will be made to several of our published works, we would particularly draw the 
Rapporteur’s attention to our reports on Social security systems based on dignity and respect and 
Destitution and paths to justice. 
A. GENERAL 
Our work draws on definitions of poverty from the Households Below Average Income survey5 – 
relative low income, absolute low income, combined low income/material deprivation, persistent 
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1 Matthews v Ministry of Defence [2003] UKHL 4 at [26] (Lord Hoffmann) 
2 Pretty v United Kingdom (app 2346/02) [2002] 35 EHRR 1 at [65]; the veracity of this statement is contested 
in A Williams, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU and the UK: confronting a heresy’ (2013) 
24(4) European Journal of International Law 1157 
3 C McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of 
International Law 665; D Feldman, ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 2’ (spring 2000) Public Law 61 
4 R v Inhabitants of Eastbourne (1803) 4 East 103, 107 (Lord Ellenborough) 
5 Department for Work and Pensions, Households below average income: an analysis of the UK income 
distribution: 1994-95 – 2016/17 (Newport: Office for National Statistics, 2018) 
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poverty and severe poverty – and the minimum income standard.6 For extreme poverty, we use the 
definition of destitution from the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, the definition of hardship from 
the Universal Credit Regulations 2013 and Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 1996 and the 
consensual definition of destitution devised by S Fitzpatrick and others.7 The Northern Ireland 
Executive has a statutory duty to devise a strategy for the reduction of deprivation based on 
objective need, but has not defined objective need.8 The value of defining and measuring poverty 
has been reduced by the repeal of the targets in the Child Poverty Act 2010, following which there is 
no duty to reduce or eliminate poverty as defined (except in Scotland under the Child Poverty 
(Scotland) Act 2017). We advocate the reinstatement of these targets and the creation of a new 
statutory duty to protect all persons lawfully present in the UK from destitution.9 The latter should 
be based on Fitzpatrick and others’ definition of destitution, which is clearer than the current 
statutory definition, enjoys public endorsement and specifies that a household only able to meet its 
essential needs through charitable assistance is destitute.10  
Poverty is associated with multiple human rights violations. The most serious is the right to 
protection from inhuman and degrading treatment, but this will only occur in extreme cases, 
normally involving street homelessness.11 Others are more widespread. The UK has consistently 
been in breach of the right to social security in article 12 ESC and aspects of the right to social 
assistance (article 13 ESC).12 The period since 2010 has seen a series of retrogressive measures in 
relation to the right to social security (article 9 ICESCR). This has put at risk the ability of claimants to 
enjoy an adequate standard of living (article 11 ICESCR), including the subsidiary rights to housing (as 
housing benefit may no longer cover housing costs) and food (evidenced by rising dependence on 
food aid).13   
Judicial opinion is increasingly of the view that social security cuts affecting families with children are 
incompatible with the duty to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in 
article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).14 The recent UK Supreme Court 
decision in McLaughlin constitutes the pinnacle of this analysis.15  The Court utilises the child’s right 
to social security to engage a right to bereavement benefits for the unmarried partner of the 
deceased, departing from the ECtHR’s analysis in Shackell.16 The judgment reasons that the ECtHR 
failed to recognise the purpose of social security for widowed parents: to benefit the children. There 
is widespread recognition that social security cuts represent gender-based discrimination in the 
                                                          
6 A Davis, D Hirsch, M Padley and C Shepherd, A minimum income standard for the UK, 2008-2018: continuity 
and change (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2018) 
7 S Fitzpatrick, G Bramley, F Sosenko, J Blenkinsopp, S Johnsen, M Littlewood, G Netto and B Watts, Destitution 
in the UK (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016) 
8 CAJ and Brian Gormally’s application [2015] NIQB 59 
9 G McKeever, M Simpson and C Fitzpatrick, Destitution and paths to justice (London: Legal Education 
Foundation/York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2018) 
10 S Fitzpatrick, G Bramley, F Sosenko, J Blenkinsopp, S Johnsen, M Littlewood, G Netto and B Watts, 
Destitution in the UK (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016) 
11 R (on the application of Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66 
12 M Simpson, ‘Assessing the compliance of the UK social security system with the state’s obligations under the 
European Social Charter’ (2018) 18(4) Human Rights Law Review (forthcoming) 
13 M Simpson, G McKeever and AM Gray, Social security systems based on dignity and respect (Glasgow: 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2017) 
14 R (SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 
15 In the matter of an application by Siobhan McLaughlin for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 48 
[2018] UKSC 48 
16 Application no 45851/99 
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enjoyment of the rights to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions and to respect for family life 
(articles 14 ECHR with article 8 and Protocol 1, article 1) although in most cases the discrimination 
has been found to be justified by the legitimate aims of the policy.17 The system of financial 
sanctions for non-compliance with conditions for receipt of a benefit threatens the right to an 
adequate standard of living, and potentially the sanctioned claimant’s right to the highest attainable 
standard of health (article 12 ICESCR).18 While conditionality is potentially supportive of the right to 
work (article 6 ICESCR), the quality of employment support for some groups, the disproportionate 
severity of sanctions and the evidence that they can increase distance from the labour market mean 
it is difficult to defend the UK approach on this basis.19 
A final area of concern is that of procedural and administrative justice in social security. Lack of 
awareness of potential entitlements, difficulty navigating the application process, poor quality 
assessments for disability and incapacity benefits, an under-resourced advice sector and the myth 
that internal reviews and tribunals can be undertaken without expert representation can act as 
barriers to individuals receiving benefits for which they should qualify.20 A particular failing of the 
conditionality regime is the suspension of benefits at the point of suspicion, before a decision has 
been taken on whether a sanction is merited and before the opportunity to appeal to an 
independent arbiter. This is of questionable compliance with the right to a fair hearing in the 
determination of one’s rights (article 14, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).21 There 
remains a difficulty in establishing whether provisions discriminate against particular groups with 
protected characteristics under equality legislation where the data collected by the government on 
impact or potential impact is not robust.22 Impact assessments conducted by the government for 
legislative proposals have often been poor and noted as such by the Social Security Advisory 
Committee.23 
                                                          
17 R (on the application of SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16; M Simpson, ‘Social 
rights, child rights, discrimination and devolution: untangling the web’ (2018) 40(1) Journal of Social Welfare 
and Family Law 3 
18 G McKeever, M Simpson and C Fitzpatrick, Destitution and paths to justice (London: Legal Education 
Foundation/York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2018) 
19 A Rees, A Whitworth and E Carter, ‘Support for all in the UK work programme? Differential payments, same 
old problem…’ (Birmingham: Third Sector Research Centre, 2013); M Adler, ‘A new leviathan: benefit sanctions 
in the 21st century’ (2016) 43(2) Journal of Law and Society 195; G McKeever, M Simpson and C Fitzpatrick, 
Destitution and paths to justice (London: Legal Education Foundation/York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
2018) 
20 G McKeever, ‘A ladder of legal participation for tribunal users’ (Winter 2013) Public Law 575; G McKeever, 
‘Improving decision making in employment and support allowance’ (2014) 21(1) Journal of Social Security Law 
13; D Cowan, A Dymond, S Halliday and C Hunter ‘Reconsidering mandatory reconsideration’ (April 2017) 
Public Law 215; M Simpson, G McKeever and AM Gray, Social security systems based on dignity and respect 
(Glasgow: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2017); G McKeever, M Simpson and C Fitzpatrick, 
Destitution and paths to justice (London: Legal Education Foundation/York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
2018) 
21 See M Adler, Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment? Benefit sanctions in the UK (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018) 
22 G McKeever, ‘Balancing Rights with Responsibilities: The Case of Social Security Fraud’ (2009) Journal of 
Social Security Law 16(3) 139 
23 The Social Security Advisory Committee is an independent arms-length body that advises government on 
social security, mainly through scrutiny of draft legislation: see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/social-security-advisory-committee and G McKeever, 
“Legislative scrutiny, co-ordination and the Social Security Advisory Committee: from system coherence to 
Scottish devolution” (2016) 23 (3) Journal of Social Security Law 126 
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We recommend that the special rapporteur include Scotland and Northern Ireland in his visit. 
Scotland has recently acquired devolved competences for social security and has enacted a statutory 
commitment to develop a system based on respect for the dignity of individuals.24 It has also 
reinstated targets for the reduction of child poverty following their abolition at UK level.25 This 
would be an opportune time for consideration of (1) what examples of good practice exist that might 
be adopted elsewhere in the UK and (2) how the Scottish Government can realise its legislative 
commitments. Northern Ireland has specific poverty-related issues including concentrations of 
deprivation, low pay, high levels of economic inactivity and the legacy of the conflict of the 1960s to 
1990s. As the only part of the UK to share a land border with another EU member state, there may 
also be region-specific impacts associated with Brexit. Devolved funds have been invested in a four-
year ‘mitigations’ package designed to shield claimants from some of the financial impacts of post-
2012 social security reforms. The rapporteur should consider the success or otherwise of these 
mitigations, the lessons for other parts of the UK and the risks to future poverty alleviation measures 
associated with the ongoing suspension of devolved government.26  
The rapporteur should meet researchers, policymakers and voluntary sector organisations with 
expertise on poverty and social security in the devolved regions, conditionality in the social security 
system and destitution. The authors of this submission would be willing to advise on potential 
contacts and participate in any meetings.  
B. AUSTERITY 
Economists will be better qualified to comment on the necessity or otherwise of deficit reduction 
after 2010, although it seems clear that options were available that might have had less of an impact 
on people at the lower end of the income distribution and the economies of poorer regions.27 
Arguably, it is not so much the fact that spending cuts occurred as where they occurred that defines 
recent governments’ philosophy.28 The protection of retirement pensions and policymaker rhetoric 
demonstrate that economic savings were not the only driver of social security cuts during the 
period. Rather, policy was “deliberately intended to… promote social and economic hardship 
precisely to point up a perceived moral distinction between those receiving benefit and those who, 
because they were in work, were deemed to be more deserving.”29  
Many post-2010 social security reforms have taken place without advance consideration of their 
impact on groups with protected characteristics under equality legislation. 30 The SSAC has noted 
that Treasury-driven reform “has regularly resulted in secondary legislation being presented to us 
                                                          
24 Social Security (Scotland) Act 2018 asp 9 s1 
25 Child Poverty (Scotland) Act 2017 asp 7 
26 D Birrell and AM Gray, ‘Welfare reform and devolution: issues of parity, discretion and divergence for the UK 
government and the devolved administrations’ (2014) 34(3) Public Money and Management 205; M Simpson, 
‘The social union after the coalition: devolution, divergence and convergence’ (2017) 46(2) Journal of Social 
Policy 251 
27 See C Beatty and S Fothergill, ‘The impact of welfare reform on Scotland’ in Welfare Reform Committee, The 
impact of welfare reform on Scotland (SP paper 303, Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament, 2013); C Beatty and S 
Fothergill, The impact of welfare reform on Northern Ireland (Sheffield: Centre for Economic Empowerment, 
2013) 
28 N Ellison, ‘The coalition government, public spending and social policy’ in H Bochel and M Powell, The 
coalition government and social policy: restructuring the welfare state (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016) 
29 N Ellison, ‘Public policy in practice’ in G Craig (ed), Handbook on global social justice (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2018) 280-1 
30  D Sands, The impact of austerity on women (London: Fawcett Society, 2012) 
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without meaningful analysis of impact or interactions with other parts of the benefit system.”31 The 
Government has sought to justify its decisions on economic grounds, the need to increase ‘fairness’ 
and the assertion that to reduce the incomes of the already-poor will ultimately leave them better 
off because of the increased stimulus to jobseeking. It is disappointing that judges considering 
judicial reviews of social security reforms have largely accepted that these matters are within the 
political judgement of the executive, even when they are empirically unsound.32 
Problems for claimants in England and Wales have been compounded by the reduction in advice 
provision for welfare-related problems, removed from the scope of legal aid by the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offender’s Act 2012. Our report evidences the perfect storm of 
significant and frequent social security reforms alongside cuts to advice provision.33 In Northern 
Ireland, additional funding was made available for social security advice and the Rapporteur could 
take evidence on whether this has been sufficient to minimise negative effects.  
C. UNIVERSAL CREDIT 
Universal Credit does not change the fact that most recipients of working age income replacement 
benefits will be in poverty, exacerbated by parallel reforms including below-inflation uprating, limits 
on housing benefit eligibility, the household benefit cap, restrictions on eligibility for child-related 
benefits and the removal of disability and family related premiums. Consequently, few human rights 
impacts will be unique to universal credit, as distinct from the wider trajectory of social security policy. 
The five-week wait for a first UC payment and monthly as opposed to fortnightly payments (in England 
and Wales) risk compounding hardship and may represent threats to the right to an adequate 
standard of living (article 11 ICESCR). There is a risk to rights under article 19 CPRD and article 28 CPRD 
for claimants who currently receive disability premiums under legacy benefit schemes, which do not 
exist in UC.34  
Some contribution to the realisation of the right to work arguably remains in the form of an 
increased financial incentive offered by the UC taper, but not to the extent initially planned and not 
universally. Single-earner couples with children particularly benefit, with fewer gains for second 
earners and lone parents.35 During the legislative passage of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 it was 
argued that a 60% taper would represent a ‘neutral’ rate, but fiscal objectives have produced the 
current, less favourable (to the claimant) rate of 63%.36  Meanwhile, the intensification of 
                                                          
31 SSAC Annual Report 2015-16, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/545870/
ssac-annual-report-2015-2016.pdf. Additionally the SSAC has noted the direct impact that this has on 
claimants. For example, the SSAC’s advice on the likely hardship flowing from UC was not followed until four 
years later when serious hardship had already been suffered: SSAC Annual Report 2017-18, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/730615/
ssac-annual-report-2017-2018.pdf 
32 See Lady Hale’s dissenting judgment in R (on the application of SG) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2015] UKSC 16; E Humpherson, annex to letter from Andrew Dilnot to Jonathan Portes (17 
September 2014) <http://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/reports---correspondence/correspondence/letter-
from-sir-andrew-dilnot-to-jonathan-portes-171214.pdf> accessed 28 August 2015 
33 G McKeever, M Simpson and C Fitzpatrick, Destitution and paths to justice (London: Legal Education 
Foundation/York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2018) 
34 See R (TP and AR) and Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2018] EWHC 1474  
35 S Adam and J Browne, Do the UK Government’s Welfare Reforms Make Work Pay? IFS Working Paper W13/26 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2013), p 17 < https://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp1326.pdf > (accessed 16 March 2018) 
36 Minister of State for Work and Pensions, Chris Grayling, 29 March 2011, Public Bills Committee (Bill 154), col 
250–251 
Evidence to SR Extreme Poverty 
Fitzpatrick, Gray, McKeever and Simpson 
6 
 
conditionality37 is arguably unnecessary – as most unemployed and many economically inactive 
claimants already aspired to return to paid employment38 – and can be counterproductive.39 Rather, 
it serves to underline the pre-eminence of jobseeking as the preferred form of reciprocity in the 
welfare state, and the devaluation of reproductive and other forms of unpaid work,40 in the process 
putting claimants at risk of destitution. 
Merging means-tested benefits within UC has the potential to reduce duplication and overlap, but is 
unlikely to result in overall simplification, as the new benefit is extremely complex. The amount of 
information that is required when making a single UC claim remains significant and a diversity of 
circumstances must be accommodated. The continued requirement for a separate claim for council 
tax reduction adds unnecessary complexity and there is a risk of increased error as claimants and 
staff adapt. 41 We would encourage the Special Rapporteur to avoid the artificial and misleading 
conflation of fraud and error that characterises official statistics and statutory definitions in the UK.42 
Levels of fraud are low and it is unclear whether UC will have any significant impact.  
D. NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN THE WELFARE SYSTEM 
One of the authors (McKeever) has spoken to the Special Rapporteur’s team on the challenges to the 
protection of privacy under the data matching provisions relating to social security fraud, 
highlighting the Information Commissioner’s concerns about the powers afforded to investigators 
under a broad ground of suspicion. There are wider concerns over the level of discretion provided to 
decision-makers and their capacity to exercise discretion appropriately.43 This lack of regulatory 
oversight is matched by a lack of legislative scrutiny of the powers devolved to departmental 
decision makers.44 
The National Audit Office sees digital exclusion as a problem for UC applicants and claimants and 
warns insufficient support is in place,45 illustrated by the experiences of some of our destitute 
research participants. Difficulty with online application and claim management could arise from a 
lack of digital literacy, unaffordability or unreliability of an internet connection, distance from or 
rationed access at a public library, reluctance to carry out a sensitive activity in a public space or 
difficulty leaving the house because of a health problem.46  
                                                          
37 P Dwyer and S Wright, ‘Universal credit, ubiquitous conditionality and its implications for social citizenship’ 
(2014) 22(1) Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 27 
38 S Wright, ‘On “Activation workers’ perceptions”: a reply to Dunn (2)’ (2013) 42(4) Journal of Social Policy 829 
39 G McKeever, M Simpson and C Fitzpatrick, Destitution and paths to justice (London: Legal Education 
Foundation/York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2018) 
40 M Simpson, ‘Renegotiating social citizenship in the devolution era’ (2017) 44(4) Journal of Law and Society 
646 
41 N Harris, Law in a Complex State: Complexity in the Law and Structure of Welfare (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
131; S Rahilly, ‘Universal Credit’ (2010) Journal of Social Security Law 18 (2) 61; P Spicker, What’s wrong with 
social security benefits? (Bristol: Policy Press, 2017) 
42 G McKeever, ‘Social citizenship and social security fraud in the UK and Australia’ (2012) 46(4) Social Policy 
and Administration 465 
43 G McKeever, “Legislative scrutiny, co-ordination and the Social Security Advisory Committee: from system 
coherence to Scottish devolution” (2016) 23 (3) Journal of Social Security Law 126 
44 G McKeever, “Legislative scrutiny, co-ordination and the Social Security Advisory Committee: from system 
coherence to Scottish devolution” (2016) 23 (3) Journal of Social Security Law 126 
45 National Audit Office, Rolling out universal credit (HC 1123, London: DWP, 2018) 
46 G McKeever, M Simpson and C Fitzpatrick, Destitution and paths to justice (London: Legal Education 
Foundation/York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2018) 
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E. CHILD POVERTY 
Among the causes of child poverty, we would highlight the level of income replacement benefits, 
which largely guarantees that children in a household in which social security is the main source of 
income will experience poverty. At 2013-14 rates, a lone parent with two children in receipt of 
jobseeker’s allowance and child tax credits would have had an income after housing costs of 48% of 
the equivalised median in a low rent area, or as low as 33% in London due to the benefit cap. The 
relative low income threshold, the most-used poverty indicator, is 60% of the median.47 The 
coalition government argued that the child poverty target for 2010-11 was not achieved because 
“not enough parents moved into work, and progressed in work.”48 There may be some truth in this, 
but it ignores the correlation between benefit increases and poverty reduction under New Labour49 
and the reality that increased employment alone cannot be relied upon to eliminate poverty.50  
Post-2010 social security policy trends are projected to increase child poverty and deepen the 
poverty of already-poor children,51 with implications for various UNCRC rights. UK courts’ 
recognition of the conflict between aspects of social security policy and the obligation to treat the 
best interests of the child as a primary consideration is a positive development,52 although we await 
the Government’s response to the McLaughlin judgment. There has also been retrogression in 
respect of the child’s right to benefit from social security (article 26) and to enjoy an adequate 
standard of living (article 27); in the poorest households the child’s right to the highest attainable 
standard of health (article 24) may be put at risk. 
F. ‘BREXIT’ 
The ultimate impact of Brexit on people living in poverty will depend on the economic and political 
repercussions, although the Joseph Rowntree Foundation has calculated that any form of Brexit will 
leave the poor worse off.53 The direct impact on social security will be limited because the EU does 
little to define minimum entitlements, only who has access to a member state’s welfare systems. 
The potential loss of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) will be 
correspondingly limited in its impact as it only binds member states when implementing EU Law. The 
“political and media preoccupation with the idea that benefits attract inward migration” points to a 
loss of access to social security benefits for migrant workers.54 However, since migrants’ social 
security rights are being rolled back by the EU in any case, it is unclear what additional impact Brexit 
will have.55 Harder to gauge is the opportunity cost of leaving the EU when its attention is turning to 
                                                          
47 Comparison of benefit levels with equivalised median incomes in the Households Below Average Income 
survey 
48 Department for Work and Pensions and Department for Education, Child poverty in the UK: the report on the 
2010 target (London: HMSO, 2012) 8 
49 R Joyce, ‘Child poverty in Britain: recent trends and future prospects’ (London: IFS, 2014) 
50 H Reed and J Portes, Understanding the parental employment scenarios necessary to meet the 2020 Child 
Poverty Targets (London: Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, 2014) 
51 R Joyce, ‘Child poverty in Britain: recent trends and future prospects’ (London: IFS, 2014); D Ghelani and G 
Tonutti, The impact of the two-child limit to child tax credits (London: Policy in Practice, 2017) 
52 R (on the application of SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 
53 JRF, How could Brexit affect poverty in the UK?, available at 
 https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/how-could-brexit-affect-poverty-uk  
54 N Harris, ‘Welfare rights, austerity and the decision to leave the EU: influences on UK social security law’ 
(2018) 25(1) Journal of Social Security Law 9, 20 
55 M Simpson, ‘Brexit and devolved social security in Scotland: a tale of two referenda’ (2018) 25(1) Journal of 
Social Security Law 56 
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a possible new pillar of social rights, albeit that Clegg suggests this may have a better chance of 
taking flight in the UK’s absence. 56 
There will be specific impacts on the social rights of cross-border workers, likely to fall particularly 
heavily on Northern Ireland given the fluidity of movement across the UK’s only land border with the 
EU and the direct impact on the removal of the EU framework on rights affecting work and financial 
security.57 There remains a lack of clarity over cross-border workers’ existing social security 
entitlements, including the right to export and aggregate social security and tax benefits to the 
‘other’ jurisdiction. While agreement may be reached on the operation of EU social security co-
ordination rules, there is a risk that cross-border workers in Northern Ireland may be left with social 
security rules that allow them to only access work or services within the UK. This has been 
highlighted by a Northern Ireland Tribunal of Commissioners’ decision where the refusal by HMRC to 
allow a Northern Ireland claimant to export benefit payments from the UK to pay for services in the 
Republic of Ireland was found to be in breach of the claimant’s Treaty rights.58  Northern Ireland has 
also been one of the main beneficiaries of EU structural funds among the UK regions, 59 while the 
Scottish Government has been vocal in its concerns about the economic impact of tighter 
restrictions on economic immigration.60 
                                                          
56 D Clegg, ‘Brexit, the UK labour market and lessons for social Europe’ in B Vanhercke, S Sabato and D Bouget 
(eds), Social policy in the European Union: the state of play 2017 (Brussels: ETUI, 2018); see also G McKeever 
and M Simpson, ‘Worlds of welfare collide: implementing a European unemployment benefit system in the UK’ 
(2017) 19(4) European Journal of Social Security 21 
57 G McKeever, ‘Brexit, the Irish border and social security rights’ (2018) 25(1) Journal of Social Security Law 34 
58 NB v HMRC (TC) NIComm 47 
59 D Birrell and AM Gray, ‘Devolution: the social, political and policy implications of Brexit for Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland’ (2017) 46(4) Journal of Social Policy 765 
60 M Simpson, ‘Brexit and devolved social security in Scotland: a tale of two referenda’ (2018) 25(1) Journal of 
Social Security Law 56 
